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ABSTRACT
Based on the claim that animals have rights, Tom Regan ultimate-
ly endorses some radical conclusions: we ought to be vegans; it’s 
wrong to wear leather; we shouldn’t care about conserving species, 
but about respecting the rights of individual animals; etc. For many, 
these conclusions are unbelievable, and incredulous stares abound. 
Incredulous stares are not arguments, but they do force us to con-
sider whether it might be reasonable for some people to reject Re-
gan’s conclusions based on their considered beliefs. My aim here is 
to argue that it is. The argument is based on an analogy between 
Regan’s defense of animal rights and David Lewis’s defense of modal 
realism. In short, if it’s reasonable to reject modal realism based on 
its incredible implications, then it’s probably reasonable to reject the 
thesis that animals have rights, and to instead accept a moral theory 
that, while much less elegant, doesn’t require abandoning any of our 
Moorean beliefs.
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Introduction
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan says that we 
ought to assess ethical theories based on how well they system-
atize our “considered beliefs.” We’re supposed to arrive at our 
considered beliefs in the following way: 
We are to begin by considering our pre-reflective intu-
itions—those beliefs about right and wrong we happen 
to have. We then make a conscientious effort to make 
the best review of these judgments we can, and we do 
this by striving to purge our thought of inconsistency 
and unquestioned partiality, and by thinking as ratio-
nally and coolly as we can, with maximum conceptual 
clarity and on the basis of the best relevant information 
we can muster. Those moral beliefs we hold after we 
had made an honest effort to meet these requirements 
are our considered beliefs, our reflective intuitions. 
(2004, 148; emphasis in original)
Then, we are supposed to identify the various theories that 
purport to explain the truth of those beliefs, evaluating them 
using five criteria: consistency, adequacy of scope, precision, 
simplicity, and conformity with our reflective intuitions. Or, 
since that last criterion specifies the data that theories are sup-
posed to accommodate, we can put the point like this:
[That theory is best, all things considered,] that (1) 
systematizes the maximum number of our considered 
beliefs, thereby having maximum scope; (2) system-
atizes them in a coherent fashion, thereby achieving 
consistency; (3) does this without compromising the 
degree of precision it is reasonable to expect and re-
quire of any moral principle(s); and (4) satisfies the 
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other criteria of evaluation on making the fewest pos-
sible assumptions necessary to do so, thereby meeting 
the criterion of simplicity. (2004, 149)
Thus far, Regan seems quite conventional. But as you surely 
know, he ultimately endorses some radical conclusions: we 
ought to be vegans; it’s wrong to wear leather; we shouldn’t 
care about conserving species, but only about respecting the 
rights of individual animals; the vast majority of animal ex-
perimentation is morally abhorrent; zoos should be abolished. 
And for many, these conclusions are unbelievable. How could 
our reflective intuitions have led us to these claims? How could 
a theory with such implications be the one that best system-
atizes our considered beliefs? How could animals have rights? 
Incredulous stares abound.
Incredulous stares are not arguments. However, they do 
force us to consider whether it might be reasonable for some 
people to reject Regan’s conclusions based on their considered 
beliefs. My aim here is to argue—much to my chagrin—that 
it is.
Speciesism as Ersatzism
The argument begins with an analogy. Regan is hardly the 
only philosopher to propose that we ought to choose between 
philosophical theories based on a range of theoretical virtues. 
Famously, David Lewis also proposed to defend his metaphysi-
cal framework based on its theoretical utility. And his modal 
realism fares well by that standard: with just two primitives—
namely, sets and (concrete) individuals—it promises analyses 
of modality, propositions, properties, causation, personal iden-
tity, and much else besides. Hence, the view scores very high 
on (qualitative) simplicity, since it only postulates two kinds, 
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and it scores very high on generality, given the sheer range of 
phenomena it promises to explain. When Lewis describes his 
worlds as a philosopher’s paradise, he isn’t exaggerating.
Nevertheless, many philosophers find the view unbelievable. 
In some cases, of course, this is because they deny that modal 
realism can deliver what Lewis claims it can. But others grant 
that modal realism provides all the benefits that Lewis details, 
and they simply don’t think that the theoretical gains are worth 
the ontological costs. As Lewis himself acknowledges:
Modal realism does disagree, to an extreme extent, 
with firm common sense opinion about what there is. 
[…] When modal realism tells you—as it does—that 
there are uncountable infinities of donkeys and protons 
and puddles and stars, and of planets very like Earth, 
and of cities very like Melbourne, and of people very 
like yourself […] small wonder if you are reluctant to 
believe it. And if entry into philosophers’ paradise re-
quires that you do believe it, small wonder if you find 
the price too high. (1986, 133)
So Lewis acknowledges—indeed, argues—that modal real-
ism is at odds with common sense. And he recognizes that, for 
that reason, many philosophers will be willing to accept many 
more primitives, or curious accounts of representation, or arbi-
trary distinctions where modal realism offers principled ones. 
That is, they’re willing to be ersatzists—they’re willing to pos-
tulate a wide range of abstract objects (among other things) to 
do the work of Lewis’s concrete worlds.
The thesis that animals have rights is akin to modal real-
ism. It’s an elegant moral theory: it postulates a simple account 
of moral status; it makes no seemingly-arbitrary distinctions 
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between individuals; it offers neat, clean analyses of cases in 
which interests conflict. It too is a philosopher’s paradise.
Nevertheless, many people find the view unbelievable. Un-
like the critics of modal realism, this is rarely because they 
deny that animal rights can deliver what its defenders claim it 
can. Rather, they reject it because it so deeply disagrees with 
common sense—they don’t think that the theoretical gains are 
worth the moral costs. To rework what Lewis says:
A commitment to animal rights does disagree, to an 
extreme extent, with firm common sense opinion about 
what we should do. When the right view tells you—as 
it does—that there are cases where you should sacri-
fice human lives to save animal lives… small wonder if 
you are reluctant to believe it. And if entry into philos-
ophers’ paradise requires that you do believe it, small 
wonder if you find the price too high.
The various ways to resist Regan’s conclusion—contractu-
alism (Carruthers 1992), “person-rearing” accounts (Jaworska 
and Julie Tannenbaum 2014), natural law (Hsiao 2015), and 
modal personism (Kagan 2016), among others—are like er-
satzism. They aren’t as elegant: they require more primitives, 
they involve accepting more arbitrariness, and they are impre-
cise where a commitment to animal rights isn’t (i.e., in explain-
ing just how much more important humans are then nonhu-
mans). Still, they are all a great deal closer to common sense 
than the alternative. And for many people, that’s enough.
It isn’t quite fair to refer to these sorts of views as “specie-
sist,” full stop. As Evelyn Pluhar notes, speciesism is “the at-
titude or practice of giving greater weight to the interests of 
certain individuals than to the interests of otherwise morally 
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relevantly similar individuals, on the grounds of species mem-
bership alone” (2006, 276). That isn’t what these views en-
courage us to do. Instead, they postulate some property that’s 
supposed to ground a difference in the moral status or relative 
moral importance of humans and other animals—that is, one 
that generally tracks species membership. And, of course, it’s 
no secret that these are attempts to preserve the very intuitions 
that the speciesist reports, albeit without making bald appeals 
to species membership as the moral-difference-making charac-
teristic: that’s the explicit aim of each such project. So we won’t 
call them speciesist, full stop. We’ll call them instances of the 
new speciesism.
With that terminological issue behind us, we can now ask 
whether it’s reasonable for proponents of the new speciesism 
to accept these views based on their ability to save common 
sense? Or are we dealing with sheer bias? Again, I think Lewis 
is helpful here. 
In an essay defending his contextualist epistemology, Lewis 
writes this:
We have all sorts of everyday knowledge, and we have 
it in abundance. To doubt that would be absurd. At any 
rate, to doubt it in any serious and lasting way would be 
absurd; and even philosophical and temporary doubt, 
under the influence of argument, is more than a little 
peculiar. It is a Moorean fact that we know a lot. It is 
one of those things that we know better than we know 
the premises of any philosophical argument to the con-
trary. (1996, 549)
If Lewis explicitly discusses the relationship between 
Moorean facts and common sense, I’m not aware of it. Still, 
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we can piece together this much. Philosophy answers to com-
mon sense (among other things), but it can still revise parts 
of it. This, of course, is precisely what Lewis recommends in 
the case of claims like, “There are no talking donkeys.” Lewis 
doesn’t deny that such claims are true when spoken in the or-
dinary business of life, but he reinterprets them so that they’re 
compatible with his modal realism. The Moorean facts, how-
ever, are the claims that are especially secure within common 
sense—hence the honorific, “facts.” These claims might be re-
visable too, but not by philosophical argument. Lewis isn’t en-
tirely clear about what it means to know one thing better than 
another, but perhaps we can run with the idea that our degree 
of confidence in any Moorean claim is significantly higher than 
any rival philosophical thesis.1 Given this distinction—be-
tween the more and less secure claims of common sense—the 
question is where to place claims such as, “The rights of an in-
fant outweigh those of an adult pig.” Presumably, proponents of 
animal rights and speciesists agree that such claims are part of 
common sense. They disagree, however, over whether they’re 
Moorean.
The upshot is this. Insofar as it’s rational to take certain 
moral claims to be Moorean, it’s rational to reject philosophi-
cal theses that would lead you to deny them. So, if it’s ratio-
nal to reject the claim that “There are cases where you should 
sacrifice human lives to save animal lives,” then it’s rational 
to reject animal rights. And if the only alternative to animal 
rights is some form of the new speciesism, then it’s rational to 
be a new speciesist—albeit tentatively, given that there may be 
1 “Reason” is intentionally singular—there may be only one reason, such as 
a principle of conservatism, that’s doing the work. However, I don’t mean 
to imply that there could only be one reason. Perhaps we have independent 
reasons in favor of thinking that each Moorean fact is indeed a fact.
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more elegant ways to underwrite the same Moorean claims. 
Lewis was willing to make massive sacrifices in terms of in-
tuitiveness to get an elegant metaphysical theory; most of us 
weren’t. Likewise, proponents of animal rights are willing to 
make massive sacrifices in terms of intuitiveness to get an el-
egant moral theory; most people aren’t. And since most people 
can reasonably say that the relevant claims are Moorean, they 
can reasonably be new speciesists. By their lights, if there is 
ever a time to sacrifice theoretical virtues, this is it.
Understandably, proponents of animal rights will resist the 
idea that their view is akin to Lewis’s modal realism. However, 
I think this is because we’ve acclimated to incredulous stares. 
We no longer flinch when people find our views absurd, which 
means that we no longer see the costs of our moral commit-
ments. As a result, we fail to appreciate why someone might be 
a new speciesist, as well as what it would take to criticize them 
for holding it. The new speciesism is strongest when it follows 
Lewis’s methodology, and then sides with the most stable parts 
of common sense.
Of course, someone might think that the problem here is 
giving so much weight to common sense. Crucially, Regan 
thinks that moral theories aren’t obliged to accommodate all 
our pre-theoretic intuitions: rather, as I said at the outset, they 
are only obliged to accommodate as many of our considered 
beliefs as possible. In the process of moving from an assort-
ment of pre-theoretic intuitions to our considered beliefs, we 
might think that we would weed out a great many moral judg-
ments that conflict with a commitment to animal rights. And 
that, of course, is exactly what Regan maintains. His case for 
animal rights doesn’t begin with a direct argument for such 
rights. Instead, it essentially begins with a case for the principle 
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of equal consideration of interests, followed by an argument 
to the effect that consequentialists build on this principle in 
the wrong way. But if we already accept the principle of equal 
consideration of interests, then our considered beliefs aren’t all 
that far from those implied by the rights view.
By contrast, Lewis doesn’t say anything about a pre-theory-
selection move from an assortment of pre-theoretic intuitions 
to a more consistent set of considered beliefs. Instead, he thinks 
that theory selection answers to our pre-theoretic intuitions. 
Of course, he also thinks that those intuitions can be revised; 
Lewis is no slave to common sense. Given this methodological 
difference, though, it seems that Lewis gives more weight to 
common sense than Regan does, and perhaps more weight than 
anyone should—at least in ethics.
However, I don’t think that this objection carries the day. 
Granted, there are methodological differences here that are 
worth exploring. But at bottom, the argument I’m making just 
depends on Lewis’s observation about the stability of certain 
beliefs—the ones we call, for that reason, Moorean—and the 
pressure on any philosophical theory to accommodate them. If 
we find ourselves unable to abandon certain claims—and it’s 
plain that many people do find themselves unable to abandon 
certain claims about the relative importance of humans and an-
imals—then our theory has to account for them. It doesn’t have 
to say that they are true in all circumstances, as Lewis himself 
demonstrates. You can accommodate by showing why those 
claims are true enough for practical purposes, as Lewis does 
when discussing the existence of talking donkeys. Sure, there 
aren’t any talking donkeys in the actual world, and that’s why 
people speak truly when they say, “There aren’t any talking 
donkeys”—we can treat that statement as having a restricted 
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quantifier, even though, when there are no restrictions on the 
quantifier, the statement is false (at least according to modal 
realism).
Unfortunately for proponents of animal rights, however, 
such practical accommodation is impossible. The payoff of the 
view is that so many of our practical judgments are mistaken: if 
we think that it’s morally permissible to sacrifice important an-
imal interest for relatively insignificant human interests—and 
nearly everyone does, many readers of this journal aside—then 
we are mistaken. So the problem of Moorean moral beliefs is 
much harder to address than the threat of commonsense judg-
ments about what there is, and that’s why it can be reasonable 
for people to be new speciesists.
The Standoff
All forms of the new speciesism are less elegant than their 
egalitarian rival. By the lights of their defenders, however, they 
fit with the Moorean facts, and that’s reason enough to accept 
the complications that they bring with them. Where does this 
leave us?
I suspect that we’re left with a standoff, one with little hope 
of resolution. This is because I’m sympathetic to something 
else Lewis says:
I acknowledge that [by affirming modal realism] my 
denial of common sense opinion is severe, and I think 
it is entirely right and proper to count that as a serious 
cost. How serious is serious enough to be decisive?—
That is our central question, yet I don’t see how any-
thing can be said about it. (Lewis 1986, 133; emphasis 
added)
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He puts the point here in terms of disagreement with com-
mon sense, but you can easily imagine the ersatzist insisting 
that the relevant common sense claims are Moorean. In any 
case, I take Lewis’s point to be that we won’t be able to find a 
mutually-agreeable method for resolving disputes about how 
costly the costs are and how beneficial the benefits are. This 
seems right to me: when our arguments turn on claims that 
some regard as non-negotiable, any method we propose to re-
solve the dispute is likely to be seen as begging the question in 
one way or another. Some disagreements aren’t tractable.
But let’s try to remain optimistic. If we can resolve the dis-
pute between egalitarians and modal personists, it won’t be by 
teasing out further implications of the latest version of the new 
speciesism. Rather, our best bet is to attack the Moorean claims 
directly.
A Moorean argument alleges that a philosophical claim is 
false based on its incompatibility with a common sense claim 
that the person takes to be Moorean. We’re most familiar with 
Moorean arguments in epistemology, where they’re marshalled 
against the Cartesian skeptic:
1. I know that I have hands.
2. If certainty is required for knowledge, then I don’t 
know that I have hands.
3. So, certainty isn’t required for knowledge.
Let’s suppose that this is a good argument. Given this, we 
might ask why it’s a good argument. Tristram McPherson takes 
up this question, suggesting that there are five indicators that 
are relevant to the merits of a Moorean argument:
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1. Your relative confidence in the Moorean and revi-
sionary theses.
2. The prevalence of philosophically naïve propo-
nents of the conflicting theses.
3. The extent and nature of the change to our beliefs 
required by the revision.
4. The relative fit of the conflicting theses with our 
epistemic paradigms.
5. The relative vulnerability of the conflicting the-
ses to debunking explanations (McPherson 2015, 
126).
By his lights, the anti-skeptical argument fares fairly well. 
First, we’re highly confident in the Moorean thesis—i.e., that I 
know I have hands. Second, there are virtually no philosophi-
cally naïve proponents of the skeptical thesis. Third, the dox-
astic changes required by the skeptical thesis would be mas-
sive, whereas no changes would be required by the claim that 
I know that have hands. Fourth, the skeptical thesis would en-
tirely undermine our epistemic paradigms, whereas the claim 
that I know that I have hands would not. Neither the skeptical 
nor the non-skeptical theses seem vulnerable to a debunking 
explanation, so they’re on a par with respect to the fifth indica-
tor. However, if McPherson is right, then four out of five indi-
cators support the anti-skeptical Moorean argument; the last is 
a draw. That’s a pretty good case in favor of the anti-skeptical 
Moorean argument.
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Interestingly, McPherson goes on to use these five indica-
tors to criticize a Moorean defense of eating omnivorously in 
response to various arguments for vegetarianism:
1. It’s permissible to eat meat.
2. If [animals have rights, or utility won’t be maxi-
mized unless we abstain from animal products, or 
compassion requires not benefitting from the suf-
fering of others, etc.], then it wouldn’t be permis-
sible to eat meat.
3. So, it isn’t the case that [animals have rights, or 
utility won’t be maximized unless we abstain from 
animal products, or compassion requires not ben-
efitting from the suffering of others, etc.].
McPherson argues that this pro-omnivory argument isn’t 
nearly as good as the anti-skeptical one. First, as confident as 
many people are that it’s permissible to eat meat, we aren’t 
nearly as confident in that claim as we are in the thesis, say, 
that we have hands—contra the Cartesian skeptic. Second, al-
though most people believe that it’s permissible to eat meat, 
there are plenty of non-philosophers who don’t, so the claim 
doesn’t enjoy near-universal acceptance. Third, and again com-
pared with skepticism, changing our minds about the permis-
sibility of eating meat wouldn’t require radical belief revision. 
Fourth, although rejecting the permissibility of eating meat 
does require trusting common sense less than we might oth-
erwise, it doesn’t otherwise threaten our ability to form moral 
judgments. Finally, the claim that it’s permissible to eat meat 
is subject to a powerful debunking argument—namely, that it 
stems from status quo rationalization.
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McPherson’s argument against the omnivore is quite com-
pelling. By my lights, if proponents of animal rights are going 
to criticize the new speciesists, they’ll need to argue similarly 
against claims like “There are cases where you should sacrifice 
human lives to save animal lives.”
How optimistic should we be about this strategy? Is it like-
ly to help us resolve the debate between defenders of animal 
rights and the new speciesists? I’m not sure. Here, I think, con-
fidence levels are much higher.2 Moreover, because there are 
few non-philosophers who reject the moral intuitions that the 
new speciesists have, extensive moral belief revision would be 
required by a commitment to animal rights. Plainly, it’s also 
the case that the thesis that animals have rights is tantamount to 
a significant challenge to our reliance on moral intuition—or, 
at least, pre-theoretic intuition. The last two points are linked. 
If animals have rights, then much of modern life is morally 
problematic, and the stable intuitions that suggest otherwise 
are all mistaken. And the problem isn’t just that we need to 
stop doing various things that are widely regarded as permis-
sible, such as killing animals for food. It’s also that we need to 
start doing things that almost no one regards as being morally 
required. Animal rights may well imply that we have extensive 
obligations that we currently don’t see ourselves as having—
e.g., duties to feed starving animals, or to try to end predation, 
or to return land to animals that have some claim to it. Hence, 
it’s hard to see how we can regard moral intuition as reliable if 
animals do indeed have rights.
2 I once had a philosopher tell me that we should doubt whether someone 
understands what’s being said if she denies that human interests outweigh 
those of chickens.
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Of course, the same debunking argument seems to be avail-
able—on the face of it, it’s reasonable to complain that people 
are engaging in status quo rationalization when they reject ani-
mal rights —and perhaps other debunking arguments are in 
the offing. So it may well be that the real debate should be over 
the merits of these debunking arguments. Unfortunately, they 
are notoriously tricky to develop without having them general-
ize in unwanted ways: if some of our most stable intuitions are 
vulnerable to debunking arguments, it would be surprising if 
others could it be explained away via similar methods. 
It seems to me, therefore, that if the analogy between specie-
sism and ersatzism is any good, then it’s probably reasonable to 
reject the thesis that animals have rights, and to instead accept 
a moral theory that—while much less elegant—doesn’t require 
abandoning any Moorean beliefs. I take no pleasure in this con-
clusion, and I hope it’s mistaken. And, of course, it’s hardly 
a criticism of Regan’s impressive legacy that his arguments 
don’t rationally compel everyone to accept their conclusions: 
that’s the norm in philosophy, not the exception. But given the 
increasing prominence of rights-based approaches to animal 
ethics, it’s worth having a clear appreciation of the epistemic 
grounds on which you might resist them.
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